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The Political Process Argument for
Overruling Quill
Edward A. Zelinsky†
INTRODUCTION
Should the U.S. Supreme Court overrule Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota?1 In Quill, the Court held that, under the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the states cannot
impose the obligation to collect sales taxes on out-of-state
vendors that lack physical presence in the taxing state.2 As
Internet commerce has grown, Quill’s physical presence test has
severely hampered the states’ ability to enforce their sales taxes.
Two years ago, whether the Court should overturn
Quill was an intellectually interesting question of little practical
import. Three events have now made this an urgent inquiry.
First, concurring in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl,3
Justice Anthony Kennedy indicated that, in “an appropriate
case,” the Supreme Court should “reexamine Quill”4 and its rule
that states may only impose sales tax collection responsibilities
upon sellers with in-state physical presence.5 Second, South
Dakota, Alabama, and Wyoming have viewed Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Direct Marketing Association as an invitation to
challenge Quill, an invitation that these three states have
accepted by imposing sales tax collection duties on out-of-state
Internet and mail-order vendors without in-state physical
presence.6 Third, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
† Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law of Yeshiva University. For helpful comments on prior drafts of this
article, he thanks Professors Brannon P. Denning, Brian Galle, Andrew J. Haile, and
Carlton Smith, and Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky of the Yale Law School class of 2018.
1 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
2 Id. at 314–18.
3 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
4 Id. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–18.
6 S. 106, 91st Leg. Assemb. Sess. § 1 (S.D. 2016) (imposing South Dakota sales
tax collection responsibilities on “any seller” of “tangible personal property, products
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota, who does not have a
physical presence in the state”); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03 (2015) (imposing
Alabama sales tax collection responsibilities on “out-of-state sellers who lack an Alabama
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Circuit, in sustaining Colorado’s remote sales reporting statute,
signaled that it was placing Quill and its physical presence test
on the path to “wash away with the tides of time.”7
Much of the Supreme Court’s case law suggests that,
under the banner of stare decisis, the Court should not overturn
Quill. This case law indicates that it is Congress’s job to modify
or reject the physical presence test established in Quill since
Quill was decided under the dormant Commerce Clause and can
thus be overturned by Congress.8 The Court has repeatedly
indicated, and stated in Quill itself, that Congress should correct
the Court when Congress has the authority to do so.9
However, a careful assessment of the federal political
process suggests a contrary conclusion, namely, that the
Supreme Court itself should overturn Quill in the Court’s role as
guardian of the states against federal commandeering.10 A
combination of factors underlay this conclusion: the tactical
advantage Quill bestows in the political process upon the
Internet and mail-order industries, the importance of the states
in the structure of federalism, the centrality of sales taxes to the
financing of state government, the severe impediment Quill and
its physical presence test impose upon the collection of these
taxes, and the unique disadvantages of the states in the federal
legislative process.
In our system of federalism as it exists today, the states
are structurally important but politically disadvantaged.
Federal legislators receive no political benefits from helping the
states. This contrasts with the political support—votes and
campaign contributions—private groups bestow for legislative
backing. Quill effectively commandeers the states to subsidize
Internet commerce by not taxing it. Quill also hands great
political advantage to the defenders of the status quo, the
Internet and mail-order sales industries that effectively sell
their goods sales tax free because of Quill’s physical presence
test. In the federal lawmaking process, defenders of current
law have the politically easier task of blocking change in a
physical presence but who are making retail sales of tangible personal property into the
state”); H.B. 0019, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017) (imposing Wyoming sales tax
collection responsibilities on “any seller of tangible personal property, admissions or
services . . . who does not have a physical presence in” Wyoming).
7 Direct Mtkg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1132, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
8 See infra Section II.A.
9 Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (“Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and
to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to
collect use taxes.”).
10 See infra Section II.B.
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process that affords them many opportunities to obstruct
change. Quill gives that advantage to the Internet and mailorder industries which need merely impede legislation to
preserve the status quo—as they have done successfully for
over two decades.
All groups losing in the Supreme Court are at a political
disadvantage in the subsequent political process. If Quill were
merely a dispute between private commercial interests, concerns
about stare decisis would counsel the Court to let Congress
decide the fate of Quill and its physical presence test. However,
more is at stake here than a dispute between private commercial
interests. The Court should protect the states’ sales taxes because
collecting these taxes is a core function of state government that
is severely impeded by Quill, because of the states’ importance to
the federal system of government, and because of the states’
unique political disadvantages in the federal lawmaking process.
Federal legislators receive direct political benefits in the
form of votes and campaign contributions for helping private
interest groups overturn Supreme Court decisions. In contrast,
these federal legislators derive no political benefits from helping
the states. Senators and representatives have no political
incentive to assist the states since the average voter does not
credit his federal congressmen for that assistance.11 The tangible
political benefits of repealing Quill—more sales tax revenues
that finance state and local services, reduced state tax rates, or
both—will redound to state and municipal officials, not to the
members of Congress who must overturn Quill legislatively. For
this reason, the Court should protect the states from the
commandeering effect of Quill in a way that the Court need not
protect private interest groups that offer political awards to
members of Congress for their assistance.
Quill stacks the political deck against the states that
confront the difficult task of securing legislation over the
opposition of well-organized interests defending the status quo.
Consequently, the Court should follow Justice Kennedy’s lead
and, as protector of the states from federal commandeering,
should itself overturn Quill.
This article proceeds in five steps. First, it describes the
origins and current status of the Quill controversy. Second, this
article explores the stare decisis argument for letting Quill
stand subject to Congress’s power to revise and the political
process counterargument for the Court to itself overturn Quill
in the Court’s role as the protector of the states against
11

See infra Section II.A.
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commandeering by the federal government. The third section
discusses the substantive merits of Quill’s physical presence
test. One of these substantive arguments is weighty: Physical
presence in the taxing state is a proxy for voice in the state’s
political process. However, ultimately this argument does not
outweigh the political process considerations that should impel
the Court to protect the states’ sales taxes by overturning Quill
and its physical presence test. The fourth section anticipates and
responds to possible criticisms of my analysis. The fifth section
recommends that, after Quill has been reversed, Congress
should enact nationwide statutory standards establishing when
an out-of-state retailer makes sufficient sales into any state for
that state to impose upon the retailer the obligation to collect
the state’s tax.
This article concludes that the Court should overturn
Quill in the Court’s role as guardian of the states against federal
commandeering in light of the combination of the relevant
factors: the tactical advantage Quill bestows in the political
process upon the Internet and mail-order industries, the
importance of the states in the structure of federalism, the
centrality of sales taxes to the financing of state government, the
severe impediment Quill and its physical presence test impose
upon the collection of these taxes, and the unique disadvantages
of the states in the federal legislative process.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE QUILL
CONTROVERSY

A.

The Origins of the Quill Controversy

Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady12 is the U.S.
Supreme Court’s definitive statement of the dormant Commerce
Clause restraints on state taxes impacting interstate commerce.
Under Complete Auto, the constitutional status of a state tax
affecting interstate commerce depends on the tax’s “practical
effect.”13 In particular, to survive dormant Commerce Clause
challenge, a state tax affecting interstate commerce must satisfy
four tests enunciated in Complete Auto: A state tax passes
judicial muster under the dormant Commerce Clause if the “tax
is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
12 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Complete Auto has generated voluminous commentary.
See, e.g., WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 131–32 (10th ed. 2014).
13 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
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interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State.”14
The Complete Auto framework has proven unforgiving.
Once a state tax provision has been found to discriminate
against interstate commerce or the taxing state has been
deemed to lack substantial nexus to the taxed activity, the Court
has stricken the challenged tax—with no opportunity for the
state to mount an affirmative defense, such as a compelling
state interest for its tax.15
Applying the stringent requirements of Complete Auto,
the Supreme Court has struck a wide swath of state tax
provisions under the dormant Commerce Clause. These stricken
provisions include Ohio’s tax credit against its motor vehicle fuel
tax limited to sales of ethanol produced in-state,16 Hawaii’s
exemption of certain locally produced beverages from Hawaii’s
tax on wholesale liquor sales,17 and Maine’s property tax
exemption for charitable camps limited to camps serving Maine
residents.18 Most recently, in Comptroller of the Treasury of
Id.
In contrast, when a state regulates interstate commerce outside the tax
context, the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause standards are less rigid. For example,
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), addressed Maine’s prohibition on the importation into
that state of live baitfish from other states. Id. at 132–33. While this prohibition
discriminated against interstate commerce, it nevertheless survived dormant Commerce
Clause challenge since the Court concluded that the Maine law served “legitimate local
purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”
Id. at 151. Under the Court’s tax-related dormant Commerce Clause case law as articulated
in Complete Auto and its progeny, no such justification can be advanced to defend a tax
which is deemed discriminatory for dormant Commerce Clause purposes.
A state law that does not discriminate against interstate commerce but that
burdens such commerce is subject to so-called “Pike balancing,” Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis,
553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008), the inquiry exemplified by Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970). In Pike, Arizona law required that “all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and
offered for sale” be packaged in Arizona in state-approved packaging. Id. at 138. Bruce
Church, Inc. grew cantaloupes in Arizona. Id. Rather than complying with that state’s
packaging law, Bruce Church, Inc. instead shipped its “uncrated cantaloupes” grown in
Arizona to the company’s facility in California “for packing and processing” in the Golden
State. Id. “[C]andidly undertak[ing] a balancing approach,” id. at 142, the Pike Court held
that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited Arizona from applying its in-state
packaging requirement in this context. Id. at 145–46. Arizona’s “tenuous interest” in that
requirement, the Court determined, did not justify the burden on interstate commerce
resulting from the prohibition of the company’s shipment of its unpackaged cantaloupes
from Arizona to California. Id. There is no such balancing under Complete Auto. A state
tax statute that flunks one of Complete Auto’s four tests cannot be salvaged by the
invocation of a counterbalancing state interest.
For a critique of Pike balancing by an important Commerce Clause
commentator, see Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 453–59 (2008) (criticizing balancing as “both
impossible and inappropriate,” id. at 456).
16 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 279–80 (1988).
17 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
18 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 567–
71 (1997).
14
15
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Maryland v. Wynne, the Supreme Court struck, on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, Maryland’s county income tax
because the tax failed to give a credit to Maryland residents for
the out-of-state income taxes they pay.19 In the tax setting, once
the Supreme Court unsheathes its dormant Commerce Clause
sword, the challenged state tax provision rarely survives.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota is part of this unforgiving
dormant Commerce Clause tax oeuvre.20 In Quill, the Supreme
Court held that the “substantial nexus” prong of the Complete
Auto test precluded North Dakota from imposing the obligation to
collect sales tax upon an Illinois corporation that lacked physical
presence in North Dakota. The Illinois-based Quill Corporation
had no stores or employees in North Dakota.21 It reached North
Dakota customers through “catalogs and flyers, advertisements
in national periodicals, and telephone calls.”22 When a North
Dakota consumer ordered a product from Quill Corporation, Quill
shipped the product to the North Dakota customer “by mail or
common carrier from out-of-state locations.”23 Quill made nearly
$1 million in sales to roughly 3000 North Dakota residents.24
Quill held that, for purposes of Complete Auto and the dormant
Commerce Clause, Quill Corporation lacked “substantial nexus”
to North Dakota since Quill had no physical presence in that
state.25 Hence, North Dakota could not impose upon Quill
Corporation the obligation to collect North Dakota taxes on Quill’s
sales to its North Dakota customers.
Quill was decided in 1992 as a matter of stare decisis. In
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,
the Supreme Court in 1967 held, on facts similar to Quill, that
a state lacked nexus to an out-of-state retailer with no in-state
physical presence.26 Hence, the taxing state in that case,
Illinois, could not require National Bellas Hess to collect taxes
on its sales to Illinois customers.

19 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015). Wynne has provoked much commentary. See
Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes
on Wynne and Direct Marketing Association, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103, 104–16
(2016). For my thoughts on Wynne, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne, 7
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797 (2016) (characterizing Wynne as a “decision as enigmatic
as it is important”).
20 Quill also held that North Dakota’s sales tax law satisfied the requirements
of the Due Process Clause. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305, 308 (1992).
21 Id. at 302.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 312–18.
26 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967).
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A generation later in Quill, the Court acknowledged that,
under subsequently prevailing circumstances, it might have
decided National Bellas Hess differently than it did,27 and that it
might have decided Quill differently had there been no National
Bellas Hess.28 However, the Quill Court concluded that reliance
interests and respect for precedent compelled adherence to the
holding of National Bellas Hess as a matter of stare decisis:
[T]he Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and has
become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry. The
“interest in stability and orderly development of the law” that
undergirds the doctrine of stare decisis therefore counsels adherence
to settled precedent.29

Thus, under Quill, an out-of-state retailer without in-state
physical presence lacks “substantial nexus” with the state into
which the retailer sells and ships its goods by mail or common
carrier. Consequently, this out-of-state retailer cannot be
compelled to collect the state’s sales and use taxes. The Quill
Court took comfort in the fact that its decision under the dormant
Commerce Clause could be reversed or modified by Congress,
which is the ultimate arbiter under the Commerce Clause.30
Quill was decided when electronic commerce was in its
infancy. Internet shopping is, of course, an infant industry no
more. Quill today severely impedes the states’ collection of
their taxes on Internet sales since an Internet seller lacking
physical presence in the taxing state cannot be compelled to
collect tax on behalf of that state.31
As a matter of law, customers who do not pay sales tax
on their Internet and mail-order purchases must declare such
sales and pay use tax to their home state in lieu of the sales tax
they do not pay.32 In practice, compliance with the legal obligation
to pay use tax is low. As electronic commerce has grown, state
revenues have been seriously hurt by the states’ inability to
impose collection obligations upon out-of-state sellers.33 This
inability has also disadvantaged conventional “brick-and-mortar”
retailers that operate old-fashioned retail stores. Because of their
27 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (“[C]ontemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence
might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today. . . .”).
28 See id.
29 Id. at 317 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 190–91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
30 Id. at 318 (“Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.”).
31 See id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring); Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in
E-Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2012).
32 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5741.01–.02 (West 2015); HELLERSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 12, at 785–800.
33 See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
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in-state physical presence, these conventional retailers must
collect sales taxes from their store-based customers while, per
Quill, their out-of-state Internet and mail-order competitors
need not collect such taxes because they lack physical presence
within the taxing state.34
Since Quill affirmed the physical presence test of National
Bellas Hess, Quill places the political burden of securing federal
legislation on those who seek to overturn that test. The states
want to overturn Quill to impose sales tax collection
responsibilities on out-of-state vendors. In addition, in-state
vendors operating brick-and-mortar stores want their out-of-state
competitors to bear the same tax collection responsibilities as do
these in-state firms.35
B.

States’ Responses to Quill’s Physical Presence Test

The states are troubled about the considerable sales tax
revenue they in practice forego on their residents’ Internet
purchases. Additionally, states are concerned by the tax-based
disadvantage imposed upon in-state brick-and-mortar sellers
who must collect sales taxes that their out-of-state Internet
competitors do not. The states have accordingly broadened the
reach of their respective sales taxes to force Internet and mailorder sellers to collect such taxes. One state response to Quill
and the growth of electronic commerce has been so-called “click
through nexus” statutes like New York’s.36 Under these laws,
Internet sellers are deemed to have the in-state physical
presence required by Quill if such sellers have local in-state
sales associates.37
Another approach is sometimes designated as “affiliate”
nexus, and is epitomized by California’s use tax statute.
California imposes upon an out-of-state seller the obligation to
collect California use tax on sales to California residents if the
See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
See infra Section I.B (discussion of Alabama, South Dakota, and Wyoming
challenges to Quill).
36 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(I)(B)(vi) (McKinney 2015); see also Overstock.com,
Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 629 (N.Y. 2013); Edward A.
Zelinsky, New York Appellate Division Upholds “Amazon” Law: Analysis, 59 ST. TAX
NOTES 93, 93 (2011) (“The appeals court correctly held that the New York statute, on its
face, comports with the dormant commerce clause physical presence nexus test
articulated in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue and confirmed in Quill
Corporation v. North Dakota.”).
37 The New York statute, for instance, defines such sales associates as “a
resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration,
directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet website
or otherwise, to the seller.” N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(I)(B)(vi).
34

35
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out-of-state seller receives services from a related corporation
located in the Golden State.38
Colorado pioneered yet another policy toward the sales
taxation of Internet commerce,39 a policy based on information
reporting. Colorado imposes three reporting requirements40
upon firms that sell at least $100,00041 of goods annually to
Colorado residents but which do not collect Colorado tax on
such sales. First, Colorado requires that a retailer that sells to
a Colorado resident without collecting sales tax must notify the
resident that “sales or use tax is due on certain purchases” and
“that the state of Colorado requires the purchaser to file a sales
or use tax return.”42 Second, the Colorado statute also requires
the retailer to send to these purchasers an annual report
analogous to federal Form 1099.43 This statement summarizes
38 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203(c)(4) (West 2012) (An out-of-state seller is
defined as one who, “pursuant to an agreement with or in cooperation with the retailer,
performs services in this state in connection with tangible personal property to be sold
by the retailer, including, but not limited to, design and development of tangible
personal property sold by the retailer, or the solicitation of sales of tangible personal
property on behalf of the retailer.”). For my earlier discussion of the California act, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, California’s Once and Future “Amazon” Law, 62 ST. TAX NOTES 83
(2011) (“California’s law may, in political terms, have provoked a game-changing
response from Amazon and its Internet peers.”). For another example of an affiliate
nexus statute, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.66(1)(a)(1) (West 2014) (“directly or by a
subsidiary or an affiliate”). See Haile, supra note 31, at 1805 (“‘[A]ffiliate nexus’
legislation . . . seeks to circumvent the physical presence requirement by imposing
nexus on out-of-state retailers based on the in-state presence of an affiliate company (a
parent, subsidiary, or sister corporation) . . . .”).
39 For my earlier discussions of the Colorado act, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Siren Song of State ‘Amazon’ Laws: The Colorado Example, 59 ST. TAX NOTES 695
(2011); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Constitutionality (and Futility) of Colorado’s Amazon
Law, 58 ST. TAX NOTES 113 (2010). For an analysis which presaged the Tenth Circuit’s
decision, see generally Andrew J. Haile, Defending Colorado’s Use Tax Reporting
Requirement, 57 ST. TAX NOTES 761 (2010) (“[T]here are plausible, and perhaps even
persuasive, arguments that [Colorado’s law] should survive commerce clause review,”
id. at 761.).
40 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5) (West 2010).
41 By regulation, the department has declared that the Amazon law’s
reporting responsibilities will not apply to firms with “de minimis” Colorado sales and
has further declared that annual sales to Colorado customers of less than $100,000 are
presumptively de minimis. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(iii) (2010).
The statutory authority for this regulation is not apparent.
42 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I).
43 Id. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A); see I.R.C. § 6041 (2012) (authorizing what is
now called Form 1099 reflecting “the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and
the name and address of the recipient of such payment”). By regulation, this obligation
does not apply as to any Colorado purchaser who buys less than $500 annually from the
noncollecting retailer. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(3)(c)(i). The statutory
authority for this regulatory exemption is also not apparent. Even if a Colorado resident’s
purchases are too small to trigger the new law’s annual reporting requirement, the
resident remains liable for Colorado use tax on his Internet purchases. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-26-202(1) (“[T]here is imposed and shall be collected from every person in this
state a tax or excise at the rate of three percent of storage or acquisition charges or
costs for the privilege of storing, using, or consuming in this state any articles of
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for the Colorado resident all of her purchases from the Internet
or mail-order retailer for the year and again reminds the
Colorado resident of her legal obligation to pay sales and use
taxes under Colorado law. Third, also similarly to Form 1099,44
the Colorado law requires the retailer to send to the Colorado
Department of Revenue information about its sales to
particular Colorado residents.45 These statutory reporting
requirements are evidently designed to prod Colorado residents
to pay use taxes on their Internet and mail-order purchases
from out-of-state vendors. These reporting requirements also
facilitate the enforcement by the Colorado tax department of
the use tax by informing the department of the amount of the
sales and the identities and addresses of the Colorado residents
purchasing from out-of-state Internet and mail-order firms.46
When the Colorado reporting act was challenged in the
federal courts, a preliminary question was whether the federal
Tax Injunction Act (TIA)47 precluded this challenge. The
Supreme Court held that it did not.48 The TIA prevents a federal
court from impeding “the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax under State law.”49 The Colorado reporting statute, the
Supreme Court held, governs an earlier stage of the process,
when information is reported to the taxpayer and to the tax
collector.50 Assessment, collection, and levy—the high court
held—come later. Consequently, the TIA does not preclude a
challenge in the federal courts to the Colorado reporting statute
as that statute governs an earlier step in the process.51
Concurring in this conclusion about the TIA, Justice
Kennedy also called for reconsideration of Quill and its physical
presence test: Quill results in “a serious, continuing injustice” by
denying the states the ability to require out-of-state sellers to
collect sales and use tax.52 “[I]n view of the dramatic
technological and social changes that ha[ve] taken place in our

tangible personal property purchased at retail.” (emphasis added)). It is, of course,
difficult for Colorado (and the other states) to collect the use tax owed by such purchasers.
44 The statutory basis for IRS Form 1099 is I.R.C. § 6041 (2012).
45 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5)(a)(II)(A).
46 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1: 39-21-112.3(4).
47 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (2012).
48 Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1131.
49 28 U.S.C. § 1341. However, the federal courts can provide relief against “the
assessment, levy or collection” of a state tax if the courts of the taxing state fail to provide “a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy” to a challenging taxpayer. Id.
50 Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1124, 1129–31.
51 Id. at 1131.
52 See id. at 1134–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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increasingly interconnected economy,”53 Justice Kennedy wrote,
the physical presence test enunciated in National Bellas Hess
and confirmed in Quill “now inflict[s] extreme harm and
unfairness on the States.”54
When the Court decided Quill, mail-order sales in the United States
totaled $180 billion. But in 1992, the Internet was in its infancy. By
2008, e-commerce sales alone totaled $3.16 trillion per year in the
United States.
Because of Quill and Bellas Hess, States have been unable to
collect many of the taxes due on these purchases. California, for
example, has estimated that it is able to collect only about 4% of the
use taxes due on sales from out-of-state vendors. The result has been
a startling revenue shortfall in many States, with concomitant
unfairness to local retailers and their customers who do pay taxes at
the register. The facts of this case exemplify that trend: Colorado’s
losses in 2012 are estimated to be around $170 million. . . . States’
education systems, healthcare services, and infrastructure are
weakened as a result.55

Because of these substantial harms, and because “a business may
be present in a State in a meaningful way without that presence
being physical in the traditional sense of the term,”56 Justice
Kennedy concluded, “[t]he legal system should find an appropriate
case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.”57
When the Tenth Circuit subsequently addressed the
constitutionality of the Colorado reporting statute, the appeals
court similarly signaled dissatisfaction with Quill and a
consequent determination to read Quill and its physical presence
test as narrowly as possible. Quill, the appeals court stated, is
“confined to the sphere of sales and use tax collection.”58 “Quill
does not establish that out-of-state retailers are free from all
regulatory requirements—only tax collection and liability.”59
Accordingly, Quill “is not controlling” as to the Colorado reporting
act, which just imposes “notice and reporting requirements”60
upon firms that do not collect Colorado sales tax.
In his concurring opinion, then-Judge Gorsuch was even
blunter about the determination to minimize and ultimately
undermine Quill. We should expect, Judge Gorsuch opined, other
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1134.
55 Id. at 1135 (internal citations omitted).
56 Id.
57 Id. For discussion of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, see Denning, supra
note 19, at 117–20.
58 Direct Mtkg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1147 (10th Cir. 2016).
59 Id. at 1145.
60 Id. at 1147.
53

54
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states to adopt information reporting statutes like Colorado’s law
and thus “erode over time” the “precedential island” established
in National Bellas Hess and confirmed in Quill.61
Judge Gorsuch analogized National Bellas Hess and Quill
to Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs62 and Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc.63
Federal Baseball created, and Toolson confirmed, the antitrust
exemption of professional baseball.64 These decisions were
subsequently affirmed by Flood v. Kuhn.65 These high-profile
cases are the classic Supreme Court decisions which, on the
merits, would have been decided differently de novo but remain in
force because of stare decisis considerations.66
According to Judge Gorsuch, the import of these baseballrelated decisions is that, even as they have “manage[d] to
survive indefinitely,” these decisions have now been “surrounded
by a sea of contrary law” rather than being enlarged and
followed.67 The same treatment, he argues, is appropriate for
National Bellas Hess and Quill. These decisions should be
interpreted narrowly so that they “never expand,”68 but instead,
“wash away with the tides of time.”69
South Dakota accepted Justice Kennedy’s implicit
invitation to challenge Quill.70 South Dakota has, by statute, now
imposed the obligation to collect that state’s sales tax on “any
seller selling tangible personal property, products transferred
electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota.”71 This
expanded statutory obligation to collect South Dakota tax applies
if the seller lacks “physical presence in the state”72 provided
either that “[t]he seller’s gross revenue” from South Dakota sales
in the current or previous year “exceeds one hundred thousand
Id. at 1151 (Gorusch, J., concurring).
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
63 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
64 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 272–73 (1972).
65 Id. at 282–84.
66 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Gobielle v. Liberty Mutual: An Opportunity to
Correct the Problems of ERISA Preemption, 100 CORNELL L REV. ONLINE 24, 35–36
(2015) (discussing Flood).
67 Direct Mtkg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorusch,
J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Maria Koklanaris, South Dakota Quickly Implementing Nexus Law That
Could Challenge Quill, TAX NOTES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/state-taxnotes/electronic-commerce-taxation/south-dakota-quickly-implementing-nexus-law-couldchallenge-quill/2016/04/25/18466676; see also S. 106, 91st Leg. Assemb. Sess. § 7(7) (S.D.
2016) (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl).
71 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016).
72 Id.
61
62
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dollars”73 or that the out-of-state seller has “two hundred or
more separate transactions” in South Dakota during the current
or prior year.74 Wyoming has adopted similar legislation.75
Alabama has by regulation also challenged Quill’s
physical presence test.76 The Alabama regulation imposes the
obligation to collect Alabama’s sales tax upon “out-of-state sellers
who lack an Alabama physical presence but who are making
retail sales of tangible personal property into the state . . . when,
[the] Seller’s retail sales of tangible personal property sold into
the state exceed $250,000 per year based on the previous calendar
year’s sales.”77
The Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA),78 passed by the
Senate in 2013, would, if enacted into law, establish nationwide
standards for states seeking to impose sales tax collection
responsibilities on out-of-state Internet and mail-order sellers. A
state complying with these standards could require sales tax
collection by any “remote seller [with] gross annual receipts in
total remote sales in the United States in the preceding calendar
year exceeding $1,000,000.”79
II.

STARE DECISIS, THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND
COMMANDEERING

A.

Stare Decisis and the Political Process

The Supreme Court distinguishes between the Court’s
responsibility to overrule its constitutional decisions and the
Court’s substantially more limited role overturning its statutory
interpretations: “Stare decisis is not an inexorable command;
rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.’ This is particularly true in
constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through
legislative action is practically impossible.’”80 “[S]tare decisis
carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute.
Id. § 10-64-2(1).
Id. § 10-64-2(2).
75 H.B. 0019, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
76 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03 (2015).
77 Id. § (1)(a).
78 Market Fairness Act, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013). The MFA was not passed in
the House of Representatives. It has been introduced in subsequent Congresses. See, e.g.,
Market Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong (2015); Remote Transactions Parity Act
of 2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong. (2015).
79 Market Fairness Act, S. 743, 113th Cong. § 2(c) (2013).
80 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
73

74
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Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take
their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any
mistake it sees.”81
In certain respects, these statements oversimplify: A
losing litigant unhappy with the Court’s construction of the
Constitution can also walk “across the street” to Congress and
seek a constitutional amendment. The Congress that sits today
may be different from the Congress that earlier passed the
legislation in question. Most obviously, Congress may be
controlled currently by a different party than controlled the
House and Senate when the disputed statute was enacted.
Despite these qualifications, the distinction between the
Supreme Court overruling its constitutional decisions and the
Court overturning its statutory interpretations is sensible. The
instances in which the Constitution has been amended to
overrule the Court can literally be counted on the fingers of one
hand.82 Accordingly, if the Court’s constitutional decisions are
to be corrected, the Court itself must do the correcting. In
contrast, statutes are ultimately creatures of Congress and can
be altered by the regular legislative process.
Characterizing the federal political process in optimistic
terms, the Court, once it decides a statutory matter, has played
in full its appropriate role by implementing Congress’s will as
expressed in the statute. Any change of law should thereafter
come from the members of Congress, the elected representatives
of the people and the ultimate authors of the statutes the Court
applies. From this optimistic perspective, Quill, decided under
the dormant Commerce Clause, falls into the same category as
statutory decisions that Congress can overturn with the
president’s consent.83 If Quill is wrong, Congress can say so by
81 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); see Matthew
R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1460 (2014) (“The
Supreme Court has long held that statutory precedents are entitled to a super-strong
stare decisis effect, stronger than either constitutional or common law precedents.”).
82 The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution (protecting each state from
federal lawsuits initiated “by Citizens of another State”), U.S. CONST., amend. XI,
overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793). The Fourteenth
Amendment (providing that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States . . . are citizens
of the United States”), U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, overturned Scott v. Sandford, 19 U.S.
(1 How.) 393, 452 (1857). The Sixteenth Amendment (authorizing Congress “to lay and
collect taxes on incomes”), U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, overruled Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment (guaranteeing
the right to vote to “citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older”), U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, overruled the part of Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970), which held that Congress lacked the authority to extend the right to vote
for state offices to eighteen year olds, id. at 280.
83 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318–19 (1992).
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adopting, under the Commerce Clause,84 the MFA or similar
legislation that would enable states to impose sales tax collection
responsibilities upon out-of-state Internet and mail-order firms.
However, an optimistic story of the political process
confronts two complications in a context like Quill. First, the
Supreme Court’s construction of a statute has significant effect
upon that process. Indeed, the Court’s interpretation of a
statute can, in practice, determine the outcome of the political
process by deciding who is the prevailing party and who is the
losing party. The party losing in the Supreme Court has the
formidable political burden of securing legislation to overturn
the Court’s decision. In contrast, the party prevailing in the
Court has the easier task of preserving the status quo by
blocking legislation that would overrule the Court’s decision in
favor of that party.
Second, in comparison with private interests seeking to
overturn a decision of the Supreme Court, the states are uniquely
disadvantaged in the federal political process, even though the
states play a critical role in the structure of federalism. Federal
legislators receive no direct political benefits from helping the
states in contrast to the political support private groups bestow
for legislative backing.
The features of the federal political process bolstering
the status quo and its defenders are well known.85 Bicameralism
requires those who would change the status quo to obtain passage
of the exact same legislation twice in the same Congress, once in
the Senate and once in the House of Representatives. As Judge
Mikva and Professor Lane observed, “[t]he intent and
consequence of this division of American legislatures into
separate but equal chambers is to make the adoption of
legislation very difficult.”86 In this context, the history of the
MFA is instructive: The MFA cleared the Senate in 2013 but
84 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o Regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”).
85 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 15 (2014) (“Congressional
organization—with its many decision points—can frustrate coherent decisionmaking . . . .”);
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 18 (9th ed.
2014) (discussing “the existence of multiple decision points for most pieces of legislation”);
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 81, at 1460 (noting “the formidable veto gates that
render legislation quite difficult”); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic
Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452
(2001) (“[I]nstitutional features of Congress such as its bicameral structure, the committee
system, and even the subcommittee system, make it difficult for Congress to overturn a
Supreme Court decision . . . .”).
86 ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 556 (3d ed. 2009); see
id. at 558 (“overcoming the centrifugal forces of bicameralism takes considerable focus,
energy and ingenuity”).
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has never been approved by the House where defenders of the
status quo have mounted a (so far) successful defense against
efforts to overturn Quill legislatively.87
Congressional committees and subcommittees also create
many bottlenecks for blocking legislation. Judge Mikva and
Professor Lane refer to the “singular power of a committee to kill
legislation.”88 Here again, the history of the MFA is revealing:
There has never been a full vote on this legislation on the floor of
the House of Representatives. The MFA is effectively bottled up
in the House Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over
that legislation.89
Then there is the Senate’s rule that filibusters in that
body can only be shut down by a supermajority vote of sixty of
one hundred senators.90 As Walter J. Oleszek observes, “the
filibuster is a powerful bargaining and blocking device.”91 The
MFA overcame the filibuster barrier in 2013, passing the
Senate with sixty-nine votes.92 However, with changes of party
and personnel in the Senate, there is no guarantee that this
can happen again.
There is also the president’s veto.93 If the president
opposes legislation that has passed both houses of Congress, his
veto requires that the legislation subsequently surmount that
veto with a two-thirds override vote in both the House and the
Senate.94 The net result of this decentralized political process is
that defenders of the status quo have many opportunities to
block change, while the proponents of change must overcome
every bottleneck to prevail.

87 Billy Hamilton, State Tax Merry-Go-Round: Why Does Chaffetz Hate the
Internet So Much?, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 43, 44 (2015) (“NetChoice, a trade association of ecommerce businesses and online consumers whose members include Facebook, eBay,
LivingSocial, and Oracle Corp. . . . has opposed the MFA.”).
88 MIKVA & LANE, supra note 86, at 126; see also OLESZEK, supra note 85, at 184
(discussing how procedures to discharge legislation from congressional committees “are
difficult to implement”).
89 See Jennifer DePaul, Goodlatte Explains Hybrid Sourcing Proposal, 80 ST.
TAX NOTES 616 (2016); Maria Koklanaris, Heitkamp Says U.S. Senate Could Act on
Chaffetz’s Online Sales Tax Bill, 80 ST. TAX NOTES 921 (2016).
90 KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING ch. 5
(1998) (discussing “the filibuster pivot”); MIKVA & LANE, supra note 86, at 267 (noting that
changes to the Senate’s traditional filibuster rule “has made the filibuster almost painless
and encouraged its use”).
91 OLESZEK, supra note 85, at 307.
92 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Three Attorneys General Are Wrong, OUPBLOG
(July 1, 2013), http://blog.oup.com/2013/07/marketplace-fairness-act-2013-constitutional/
[https://perma.cc/4TFG-ZJCE].
93 KREHBIEL, supra note 90, at ch. 6 (discussing “the veto pivot”).
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing presidential veto).
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Professor Eskridge’s study of statutory overrides95
confirms that the federal political process is biased against
change. Consequently, the Supreme Court bestows considerable
political advantage upon the prevailing party, which, armed
with the Court’s decision, has the comparatively easy task of
blocking legislation to protect the status quo in a process that
affords many opportunities for such blocking.96
The states (like other constituencies) can often persuade
Congress to overturn their defeats in the high court when there
is no coherent interest group on the other side defending the
Court’s decision. However, Congress does not typically reverse
the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions when a well-organized
party prevails in the Court and therefore opposes legislative
override. As Professor Eskridge formulates this political reality,
“Congress is unlikely to pass legislation on an issue that produces
a ‘conflictual’ demand pattern, where important interest groups
differ sharply over what should be done.”97 Thus, for example,
states can induce Congress to overrule Supreme Court decisions
in the area of criminal law since there is no coherent constituency
pushing against the states in this context.98
When, however, there is “a ‘conflictual’ demand
pattern”99 for overriding the Court, the result is typically a
legislative stalemate. Congress does not overturn the Court
when the pressure to overturn is counterbalanced by similarly
coherent pressure to preserve the status quo as embodied in
the Court’s decision.
B.

Federal Commandeering of the States

Moreover, when cases like Quill are decided against the
states, the features of the legislative process favoring the
status quo are compounded by the unique weakness of the
states in the federal political process. While the states play a
pivotal role in the structure of federalism, the states are also at
95 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 331–35 (1991).
96 Id. at 359–61.
97 Id. at 365 (“In the last twenty-four years, there have been only a handful of
overrides in which Congress acted against the strong opposition of an important interest
group, and the overrides in those cases required a herculean effort, id. at 367.”). The
concept of “conflictual demand” does not play the same prominent role in Professor
Eskridge’s updating of his earlier study. However, he acknowledges that, in the context of
ERISA, Congress “has done nothing to clarify and improve this area of law, presumably
because the relevant interest groups (banks versus unions) are politically balanced.”
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 81, at 1366–67.
98 Eskridge, supra note 95, at 362.
99 Id. at 365.
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a particular disadvantage in Congress when they contend
against well-organized private interest groups.100 Senators and
representatives have no political incentive to assist the states
since the average voter does not credit his federal congressmen
for that assistance.101 The tangible benefits of repealing Quill—
more sales tax revenue which finances state and local services,
reduced tax rates, or both—will redound to the political
advantage of state and municipal officials, not to the members
of Congress who must overturn Quill legislatively.
In the context of standing, the Court recognizes that
“States are not normal litigants” but are entitled to “special
solicitude.”102 So too, in a dormant Commerce Clause context like
Quill, the states’ importance to the structure of federalism
combined with their weakness in the federal legislative process
makes the states different from private litigants. It is even more
difficult for states to obtain a congressional override of a Supreme
Court decision than it is for private interests, as private interests
can directly bestow political benefits upon members of Congress
in the form of votes and campaign contributions. Here too, the
states need “special solicitude” from the Court.
The political weakness of the states is reflected in the
unfunded mandates imposed upon the states by the federal
government. Such mandates stem from the general electorate’s
difficulties monitoring elected officials, the self-interested
behavior of those officials, and the consequent ability of wellorganized interest groups to prevail in the congressional
process at the expense of states and localities.103 Elected
officials impose unfunded mandates upon lower levels of
government to obtain the support of the organized groups
benefitting from such mandates. Federal mandates foist the
costs of compliance upon the state and local officials who must
implement and pay for such mandates.104
The mandate-awarding senator or congressman acquires
the political support of the mandate-receiving interest group at
no cost to the senator or congressman. The cost of the mandate
100 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 745 (1997) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem]; Edward A.
Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1407 (1993)
[hereinafter Zelinsky, Hidden Taxation].
101 Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100, at 744; Zelinsky, Hidden
Taxation, supra note 100, at 1374.
102 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 520 (2007).
103 Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100, at 744; Zelinsky, Hidden
Taxation, supra note 100, at 1374.
104 Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100, at 745–46; Zelinsky, Hidden
Taxation, supra note 100, at 1367–68.
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falls upon the governors, state legislators, and mayors who
must implement the federal mandate by raising taxes or by
reducing other spending to pay for the mandated services. The
average voter does not monitor this dynamic, and thus blames
state and local tax increases or service contractions on the
governors, legislators, and municipal officials who must implement
the mandate imposed upon them from above in Washington.105
The average voter does not perceive that the ultimate
authors of these state and local taxes and service reductions are
the federal legislators who force the states to provide mandated
services and thereby burden the states with costs which
culminate in higher taxes or fewer services (or both). On the other
hand, the well-organized interest group benefitting from a
congressionally imposed mandate understands that the mandateimposing members of Congress are responsible for the largesse
bestowed upon them by the federal mandate.106 That group can
award its votes and campaign contributions to the federal
legislators who enacted that mandate for the group’s benefit.107
Governors, mayors, and state legislators are at a
distinct disadvantage when they lobby in Washington to avoid
new mandates or to seek repeal of existing mandates. As a
practical matter, state and local officials cannot be too critical
of any mandate-imposing congressman or senator because the
states and their municipalities simultaneously depend on these
legislators for federal funding of other programs.108 In the past,
strong party organizations and vibrant party ties helped
105 Much legal and economics literature addresses the problem of “agency costs,”
i.e., the difficulties principals have monitoring their agents and the consequently selfinterested behavior in which poorly monitored agents engage at such principals’ expense.
See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Public-Private Contracting and the Reciprocity Norm, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 (2004). The unfunded mandate is fundamentally an agencycost phenomenon. See Zelinsky, Hidden Taxation, supra note 100. More generally, the
political weakness of the states in Congress is a problem of agency costs as the average
voter does not monitor or understand the costs Congress can inflict upon him by
burdening the states.
106 Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100, at 744; Zelinsky, Hidden
Taxation, supra note 100, at 1374.
107 Professor Schick advances a similar analysis when he contrasts the politics of
the Social Security trust fund with the politics of the now-defunct trust fund that
financed federal revenue sharing with state and local governments. ALLEN SCHICK, THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 43–44 (3d ed. 2007). The Social Security
trust fund is politically secure because members of Congress respond to the concerns of
current and future benefit recipients. Id. The political heft of these beneficiaries makes
the Social Security fund “politically sensitive.” Id. at 44. On the other hand, the revenue
sharing trust fund “made payments to state and local governments rather than to
individuals or households.” Id. “Its advocates were too weak to deter Congress from
abolishing the fund when it wanted the money for other programs.” Id.
108 See generally Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100; Zelinsky,
Hidden Taxation, supra note 100.
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governors and state legislators to resist federal mandates.109 A
governor in an earlier era of robust party bonds could call an
influential party chairman who could, in turn, ask the state’s
U.S. senators and representatives to refrain from hurting the
party by forcing the governor to raise taxes to pay for federally
mandated services.
No more. In an era of weak party ties,110 a U.S.
congressman or senator is as likely to view a governor or a
state legislator as a potential rival rather than as a fellow
party member to be succored.
Quill resembles an unfunded mandate imposed upon
the states and their localities.111 That mandate denies the
states and their municipalities the ability to impose sales tax
collection responsibilities on out-of-state Internet and mailorder sellers. By blocking legislation to overturn Quill and its
physical presence test, federal representatives and senators
preserve this judicially imposed mandate and thereby reward
the Internet sales and mail-order industries by keeping
purchases from out-of-state vendors effectively sales tax free.
While the political advantages of protecting Quill
redound to the benefit of federal legislators, the costs of that
decision fall upon governors, mayors, and state legislators.
These elected officials must either curtail government services in
light of lower sales tax revenues or must increase sales tax rates
to squeeze more out of narrower sales tax bases which effectively
omit Internet and mail-order sales by out-of-state vendors.112
Members of Congress have no political incentive to help
the states protect their respective sales tax bases. The Internet
sales and mail-order industries can (inaccurately but powerfully)
label strengthened use tax enforcement as a new tax.113 Most
109 See generally Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100; Zelinsky,
Hidden Taxation, supra note 100.
110 Much literature on American politics documents the weakening of party
ties. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon,
Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176
(2014). In contrast, Professor Kramer, while acknowledging the evolution of political
parties, believes that they still protect the states’ interests in the federal political
process. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000). As I make clear in the text, I disagree.
111 Brian Galle, Congressional Control of State Taxation: Evidence and
Lessons for Federalism Theory, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM 1, 3
(Jonathan Klick ed., 2017).
112 See generally Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100; Zelinsky,
Hidden Taxation, supra note 100.
113 See, e.g., Carl Szabo, Why This Tax Bill Is Unfair, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2016), http://
www.cnbc.com/2016/04/14/why-this-tax-bill-is-unfair-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/
DTM9-3KCD] (“At both the federal and state levels big box stores are lobbying for new
unfair taxes on our nation’s small internet retailers.”).
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politicians seek to avoid the perception that they are imposing a
new tax. Federal senators and representatives get no political
credit for lower state sales tax rates resulting from better
enforcement of purchasers’ use tax obligations. Nor do such
senators or representatives obtain political benefits from any
state spending financed by the revenue raised by enhanced
enforcement of the use tax.114 These senators and representatives
may, moreover, perceive a risk that they will be blamed for the
tax burdens if they authorize enhanced enforcement of the sales
and use taxes on remote sales.
In short, Congress will generally not overturn the
Court’s decision when there is a well-organized interest favoring
the status quo created by that decision. The Internet sales and
mail-order industries are such interests that have the political
advantage of defending current law under Quill. Federal
senators and representatives have strong political interests in
accommodating the Internet sales and mail-order industries and
have no countervailing incentives to protect the states or the
states’ sales taxes since federal legislators get no political credit
for state programs or reduced state tax rates. While the states
are critical to the structure of federalism, they are uniquely
disadvantaged in the federal political process in comparison to
private interest groups, which bestow political benefits in the
form of votes and contributions on senators and representatives
who assist in overturning Supreme Court decisions.115
Against this background, the surprise is not that the
MFA has failed but that it even passed the Senate once. The
most compelling political explanation for that passage is that
the conventional retail industry, which must collect sales taxes
at its brick-and-mortar retail stores, convinced one house of
Congress to overturn the Court and thereby override the proQuill preferences of the Internet and mail-order sales industries.
But one should not assume that this one-time political victory
can be replicated or extended. If the interest of the states in the
effective enforcement of their sales taxes is to be protected, the
Court must do the protecting by reversing Quill and its physical
presence test, thereby permitting the states to impose sales tax
collection responsibilities on out-of-state vendors that lack
physical presence in the taxing state.
The Supreme Court has been ambivalent about its role
as protector of the states from untoward interference from the
114 See generally Zelinsky, Unsolved Problem, supra note 100; Zelinsky, Hidden
Taxation, supra note 100.
115 Galle, supra note 111, at 7–8, 17.
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national government. Sometimes, the Court has acted as the
umpire of federalism, shielding the states from the
“commandeering” acts of the national government.116 At other
times, the Court has told the states that they must themselves
defend their interests politically in Congress rather than look to
the judiciary for relief from such commandeering acts.117 Justice
John Paul Stevens criticizes the Court for restraining alleged
“commandeering”118 since, inter alia, the “members [of Congress]
represent the interests of the several states.”119 Justice Stevens’s
perspective is shared by important scholars who similarly
conclude that the states can and should protect their interests in
the halls of Congress without help from the judiciary.120
I come to a different vantage in a dormant Commerce
Clause context like Quill. In this setting, the states are
significantly disadvantaged in the political process in competition
with private interest groups, which, in return for support, bestow
tangible political benefits in the form of votes and campaign
contributions. One could view the Senate’s passage of the MFA as
a sign that the political process is working as the invariable tug
and pull of democratic debate plays out. This perspective would
counsel the Court to stay its hand in the name of stare decisis and
let the legislative process determine the fate of Quill and its
physical presence test.
However, the political framework in which the MFA is
being debated is a framework that the Court itself created by
deciding Quill. Had Quill gone the other way, the Internet
sales and mail-order industries, as the losers in the litigation,
would likely be seeking federal legislation to provide uniform
national rules for the taxation of remote sales. Instead, under
Quill, these industries have the stronger political hand of
defending the status quo under which they effectively sell sales
tax free into states where they have no in-state physical
116 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012)
(Court “strike[s] down federal legislation that commandeers a State’s legislative or
administrative apparatus for federal purposes.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
925–27 (1997) (Court strikes as improper “Federal commandeering of state governments”
the provisions of the Brady Act that required a state or local “chief law enforcement
officer” to perform certain federally mandated activities in connection with the transfer of
handguns.); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Court strikes legislation which
“operate[s] to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions.”).
117 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (overturning National League of Cities v. Usery out
of “respect for the reach of congressional power”).
118 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE
THE CONSTITUTION 15–30 (2014).
119 Id. at 24.
120 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 110, at 259–60.
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presence. The states (and their allies in the brick-and-mortar
retail sales industry) are playing with a political deck that
Quill stacked against them.
Given the political realities that uniquely disadvantage
the states, the Court should not rely on Congress to correct
Quill. The Court should instead embrace its role as the protector
of the states and should itself correct Quill and its physical
presence test, which effectively commandeers the states for the
cause of a sales-tax-free Internet.
III.

THE POLICY MERITS OF QUILL’S PHYSICAL PRESENCE TEST

I have so far told a political process story of procedural
bottlenecks, interest group pressures, commandeering, and the
states’ unique political disadvantages in contrast to private
interests that provide political benefits—votes and campaign
contributions—to the members of Congress who help them
overturn the Supreme Court’s decisions. This kind of argument
today is largely advanced under the heading of public choice
theory.121 Let us now consider Quill and its physical presence
test on their substantive merits.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Direct Marketing
Association summarized the pragmatic argument that Quill,
whatever its validity in an earlier age, is wrong for today: As a
result of “dramatic technological and social changes,”122 namely,
the rise of electronic commerce, the states lose enormous sales
tax revenues because they cannot require out-of-state vendors
to collect sales taxes. The resulting revenue losses weaken the
“States’
education
systems,
healthcare
services,
and
infrastructure.”123 Moreover, the effectively tax-free status of
Internet sales is unfair to “local retailers and their customers who
do pay taxes at the register.”124 Finally, today “a business may be
present in a State in a meaningful way without that presence
being physical in the traditional sense of the term.”125
Judge Posner highlighted instances in which the
Supreme Court has reversed its decisions on pragmatic

121 Public choice theory has become central to much legal scholarship. See, e.g.,
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 209 (2016).
122 Direct Mtkg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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grounds.126 Such reversals are prompted by “the consequences
of” existing cases “for their bearing on sound public policy.”127
Overturning Quill would be an example of such a pragmatic
reversal. The Court would overturn Quill based on experience
with the physical presence test and the unsatisfactory results of
that experience in light of the growth of Internet commerce and
the concomitant losses of substantial state sales tax revenues.
There is considerable force to this pragmatic argument.
Indeed, I argue below128 that this argument distinguishes Quill
(which the Court itself should reverse) from the Court’s other
dormant Commerce Clause cases, which the Court, under the
banner of stare decisis, should instead let Congress evaluate.
However, a purely pragmatic approach does not explain
why the Court, rather than Congress, should overturn Quill.
The losing party can always point to the bad consequences it
suffers from having lost in the Court. As a matter of stare
decisis, it requires more than one side’s bad results for the Court
to overrule itself. The states’ importance in the structure of
federalism combined with their unique political disadvantage in
the federal political process are the additional considerations
required to buttress the pragmatic case for overturning Quill:
States, unlike private interests, do not bestow votes and
campaign contributions on the federal legislators who assist the
states to overrule the Court’s decision.
The prime rationale that Quill and National Bellas Hess
advance for the physical presence test is the protection of the
retail sales industry from the burden of collecting sales taxes
from multiple jurisdictions with multiple rates and multiple
bases.129 Many localities have their own sales tax rules.130 The
Court used the physical presence test to spare mail-order firms
from the burden of complying with the sales taxes of any state
or municipality into which such firms merely sell goods without
having a store, employee, or other physical presence in the
jurisdiction.131 The National Bellas Hess Court articulated its
concern with the potential burden created by myriad sales tax
collection responsibilities in these terms:

126 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 54–55 (2008) (characterizing
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), as “a
triumph of pragmatism”).
127 Id. at 13.
128 See infra pp. 1210–11.
129 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 & n.6 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
130 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 652.
131 Id.
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[I]f Illinois can impose such [sales tax collection] burdens, so can
every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the
Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many
variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle
National’s interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose
“a fair share of the cost of the local government.”132

In this same vein, the Quill Court warned that, if it
upheld North Dakota’s imposition of sales tax collection
responsibilities on an out-of-state vendor with no physical
presence in North Dakota, “similar obligations might be
imposed by the Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions.”133
However, Justice Fortas’s National Bellas Hess dissent
has proved more prescient than these forebodings. Justice
Fortas dismissed the concern that vendors will be overburdened
by the duty to collect different states’ and localities’ respective
sales taxes.134 Writing for himself and for Justices Black and
Douglas, Justice Fortas asserted that the burden of collecting a
variety of different sales taxes is well within “the skill of
contemporary man and his machines.”135
That indeed has been the case. Today, many of the
nation’s leading retailers, including Staples136 and Wal-Mart,137
pursue a “click-and-brick” strategy138 whereby they sell both
electronically and through their conventional retail stores. Since
those stores constitute physical presence under Quill, these
nationwide firms must collect sales tax on their Internet sales
wherever they have a physical store—which is pretty much
everywhere. These click-and-brick firms appear to be collecting
in satisfactory fashion sales taxes on their Internet sales
throughout the nation.139
An interesting development in this context has been the
evolution of Amazon’s business model. Once the epitome of the
completely virtual Internet vendor, Amazon today has physical
presence throughout the nation via local distribution centers140
Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60 (footnotes omitted).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 & n.6.
134 Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
135 Id.
136 See STAPLES, www.staples.com [https://perma.cc/3QNP-7VUY].
137 See WALMART, www.walmart.com [https://perma.cc/PA8C-6PPU].
138 Haile, supra note 31, at 1804.
139 To validate this claim, I engaged in primary research: I purchased on these
websites. With no bother, both collected the appropriate sales tax.
140 Nick Wingfield, Amazon’s Profits Grow More Than 800 Percent, Lifted by
Cloud Services, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/technology/
amazon-earnings-profit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W973-KXJA] (“In a conference call,
132

133
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as well as retail stores.141 When Amazon establishes an in-state
physical location, it collects the sales taxes of that state on its
Internet sales to consumers in that state.142 Again, this
collection of sales tax on Internet purchases is occurring with
no significant problems.143
A better rationale for the physical presence test is that
physical presence is a rough, but administrable, proxy for voice in
the political process of the taxing state.144 From this vantage,
taxing a person without physical presence is the proverbial
“taxation without representation.” This is the weightiest
argument for Quill’s physical presence test but is ultimately not
weighty enough.
Consider in this context the aftermath of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair.145 The
best interpretation of this aftermath is that, in light of
Moorman, many states shifted their corporate tax burdens onto
corporations with less in-state physical presence and thus less
voice in the political processes determining state tax policy.
Before Moorman, most states apportioned the income of
multistate corporations using a three-factor formula derived
from the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.146
Under this then-standard formula, a taxing state calculated
three fractions: the percentage of a multistate corporation’s total
sales which occurred in the taxing state, the percentage of the
corporation’s total payroll incurred in the taxing state, and the
percentage of the corporation’s total property located in the
taxing state.147 These three fractions were then averaged to
Amazon’s chief financial officer, Brian Olsavsky, said that the company would open 18
new fulfillment centers—the warehouses from which it processes customer orders—in
the third quarter of this year, three times the number it opened in the same period last
year.”); Mark Faggiano, Where Are the Amazon Fulfillment Centers, TAXJAR (Mar. 22,
2017), http://blog.taxjar.com/amazon-warehouse-locations/ [https://perma.cc/WH8N-NQ8C].
141 John Cook, Amazon Venturing onto Powell’s Home Turf, Picks Portland for
Third Brick-and-Mortar Bookstore, GEEKWIRE (June 17, 2016), http://www.geekwire.
com/2016/amazon-ventures-onto-home-turf-powells-plans-third-brick-mortar-bookstoreportland/ [https://perma.cc/ZHN3-FLRF].
142 Tripp Baltz, Top E-Retailers, States Battle in Evolving Digital Sales Tax,
BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2016), https://www.bna.com/top-eretailers-states-n57982076588/
[https://perma.cc/754L-EKMN] (“Amazon.com now remits sales taxes in 28 states,
covering more than three-quarters of its customer base . . . .”).
143 I suspect that many readers have recently made purchases on Amazon and
had sales tax withheld. The doubters may visit www.amazon.com for themselves.
144 Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 51–59 (2008).
145 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
146 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 846–47
(Minn. 2016) (discussing the Multistate Tax Compact and the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act); see also Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94,
96–100 (Cal. 2015) (same).
147 See cases cited supra note 146.
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determine the portion of the multistate corporation’s total profits
assigned to the taxing state for corporate income tax purposes.148
Suppose, for example, that Corporation X had annual
profits of $1,000,000. Suppose further that Corporation X for this
year made 10% of its sales in State Q while having 20% of its
payroll and 30% of its property in State Q. The average of these
three fractions is 20%.149 On these assumptions in the preMoorman world, Corporation X was required to report $200,000 of
its total profit to State Q for corporate income tax purposes.150
Moorman held that, as a constitutional matter, states
have “wide latitude” to determine their respective formulas for
apportioning to themselves the income of multistate
corporations.151 Accepting Moorman as an invitation to depart
from the three-factor apportionment formula, many states chose
to weigh more heavily the sales fraction.152 Typically, in these
states, the sales fraction is double counted. To continue this
example, with the sales factor double counted, the apportionment
fraction for Corporation X would decline to 17.5%153 and thus the
income of multistate Corporation X apportioned to State Q
would be reduced to $175,000.154
Consider now Corporation Y which is identical to
Corporation X in all respects except that Y has minimal instate physical presence in State Q, but makes substantial sales
into State Q. Assume in particular that, for the year in
question, Y (like X) had total profits of $1,000,000, but that its
sales in State Q represented 19% of Y’s total sales. Assume
further that 1% of Y’s payroll and 1% of its property were
located in State Q. Under the pre-Moorman formula, which
weighed sales, payroll, and property equally, Corporation Y
paid State Q income tax on $70,000 of its profits.155 Under the
post-Moorman formula which double weights sales, the amount
of Y’s income reportable to State Q rises to $100,000.156
As a matter of tax policy, these results are
counterintuitive. Why should State Q reduce state income taxes
for Corporation X and increase state income taxes for Corporation
Y? Corporations X and Y are identical in all respects except that Y
made more of its sales in State Q while Corporation X had fewer
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

See cases cited supra note 146.
(10% + 20% + 30%)/3 = 20%.
20% x $1,000,000 = $200,000.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 501.
(10% + 10% + 20% + 30%)/4 = 17.5%.
17.5% x $1,000,000 = $175,000.
(19% + 1% + 1%)/3 = 7%; 7% x $1,000,000 = $70,000.
(19% + 19% + 1% + 1%)/4 = 10%; 10% x $1,000,000 = $100,000.
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sales but more of its payroll and property in State Q. Corporation
X is a heavier user of Q’s public services than is Corporation Y
since X has more of its operations in State Q. Corporation X, for
example, is a heavier user of State Q’s police and fire services
than is Corporation Y since X has more of its plant and employees
in the state and thus has more property and personnel covered by
these protective services. Corporation X has more employees
driving on the roads of State Q to commute to work than does
Corporation Y. Yet, the post-Moorman change to State Q’s
apportionment formula, by double counting the sales factor,
reduced X’s corporate income taxes and increased Y’s corporate
income taxes.
The most compelling explanation for this shift of State
Q’s corporate tax burden from X to Y is political, in particular,
disparity between the political voice of these two corporations:
Corporation X with more in-state employees and property has
(along with its similarly situated peer companies) more influence
in the political process assigning Q’s corporate tax burden. Most
obviously, X, in contrast to Y, has more in-state employees who
vote. When X proclaims that it needs lower state taxes to remain
in-state, that claim will resonate with the legislators of State Q
who represent the more numerous X employees.
Factories and distribution centers don’t vote. But
governors and legislators don’t like closed buildings. Again,
Corporation X’s larger operational presence in State Q adds heft
to its political voice. The president of Y can also threaten to
leave the state, but his employee-based constituency is smaller,
as is Y’s physical footprint in State Q. The president of Y can
vow to stop selling to consumers in State Q unless Y’s state
corporate taxes are reduced. However, that is not likely to be
perceived as a serious threat. Corporation Y can hire lobbyists
and can form a political action committee (PAC) to intervene in
State Q’s election. But, at the end of the day, Y’s political voice is
not as great as X’s in State Q’s political process.
Let us now postulate a third multistate corporation,
Corporation Z which is identical to X and Y except that
Corporation Z has no payroll or property in State Q. Corporation
Z just sells product into Q by the Internet or by mail order.
Corporation Z is not without political resources. It can also hire
lobbyists and form a PAC. But Z, lacking employees and physical
operations in Q, has less political voice in Q than even Y.
The post-Moorman experience confirms the intuition
that in-state physical presence is an administrable proxy for
political voice. The states which have rejiggered their respective
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corporate income tax laws have thereby shifted more of the
corporate tax burden onto corporations with relatively less instate physical presence to the benefit of corporations with
greater in-state physical presence and thus greater voice in the
taxing state’s political process.
Like all administrable proxies, in-state physical presence
is not a perfect indicator. But physical presence is a serviceable
proxy for in-state political voice and thus provides a stronger
rationale for the physical presence test.
Consider again the decisions of Alabama, South Dakota,
and Wyoming to challenge Quill and its physical presence rule
by demanding that out-of-state vendors collect tax on their sales
to Alabama, South Dakota, and Wyoming residents.157 The firms
affected by these new rules have neither employees nor physical
presence in these three states. They can thus credibly assert
that they are being taxed without representation.
A potential retort is that all source-based taxation is
taxation without representation. If a resident of State A owns a
rental property in State B, she must pay state income taxes to
B on the rent she receives even though she votes in State A.158
On the other hand, property owners are an important interest
group in the political process. Though a resident of State A
does not vote in State B, she can support, through
contributions and lobbying, the association of State B property
owners, a group that will include residents (and thus voters) of
State B. When the legislators of State B favor property owners,
the benefits flow to all property owners. This might be viewed
as a form of virtual representation,159 as the property owners
who vote in State B effectively protect the interests of the
absentee property owners who live in State A.
When, however, a resident of State A sells products on
the Internet to a resident of State B, no State B legislator has
an incentive to protect the interests of this out-of-state resident
on the subject of sales taxes. Indeed, the interests of State A
residents who sell to consumers in State B conflict with the
interests of the sellers who are physically resident in State B.
The seller located in State A wants continued Quill-based
immunity from the obligation to collect State B sales taxes. The
157 S. 106, 91st Leg. Assemb. Sess. § 1 (S.D. 2016); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-62-90.03(1) (2015); H.B. 0019, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
158 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(b)(1)(A) (McKinney 2010) (A nonresident’s
New York income includes income “attributable to: (A) the ownership of any interest in
real or tangible personal property” located in New York.).
159 See generally Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) (discussing
“virtual representation”).
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seller resident in State B, in contrast, wants his obligation to
collect State B sales taxes extended to the seller physically
located in State A. In this case, there is no virtual
representation of out-of-state sellers by in-state sellers. Rather,
the in-state sellers with physical presence in State B have
precisely the opposite interests as the out-of-state sellers
located in State A but selling into State B.
These considerations had earlier led me to conclude that
Quill’s physical presence test was a sensible measure that
precluded the states from exporting their tax burdens while
Congress came to a reasonable resolution of the problem of the
sales taxation of Internet sales.160 This vantage has proved overly
optimistic since Congress is not providing that reasonable
resolution and does not appear likely to provide that resolution.161
However, to revisit Quill, the Court need not confront
the question whether the physical presence test is persuasive
in other contexts such as state corporate income taxes.162 The
issue presented by such revisitation is whether, as to sales and
use taxes, Complete Auto’s “substantial nexus” test should
continue to be construed as requiring in-state physical presence.
I conclude that it should not because of the importance
of the states to the structure of federalism and the pronounced
disadvantage of the states in the federal political process. Quill
commandeers the states to provide a sales-tax-free Internet
and thus should be corrected by the Supreme Court itself to
protect the states’ sales taxes—a critical state function.
IV.

CRITICISMS

In this section, I anticipate and respond to possible
criticisms of my analysis. Consider first the potential criticism
that I press the concept of “commandeering” farther than the
Zelinsky, supra note 144, at 71–78.
I still perceive potential value in other contexts of the physical presence test
as a proxy for political voice. While taxes are specialized and technical in nature, they are
simultaneously and intensely political. Taxes are ultimately about allocating the cost of
government, an inherently political task as the post-Moorman experience has
demonstrated. It is tempting for governors and state legislators to export the cost of
government by taxing more heavily corporations with less in-state physical presence,
thereby taxing more lightly corporations with in-state employees and physical presence
through offices, factories, and similar facilities.
162 Another context in which physical presence is a useful (indeed, constitutionally
compelled) consideration is the taxation by some states, most notably New York, of the
incomes nonresidents earn outside the taxing state. Edward A. Zelinsky, Hillenmeyer,
“Convenience of the Employer,” and the Taxation of Nonresidents’ Incomes, 64 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 303, 304 (2016) (“Hillenmeyer properly implements the due process case law of the
United States Supreme Court barring extraterritorial taxation. Hillenmeyer also reaches
better results as a matter of tax policy.”).
160

161
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Supreme Court has taken it. The cases in which the Court has
protected the states under the commandeering label have
involved statutes by which Congress imposed obligations upon
the states to affirmatively act to implement federal policies. For
example, Printz v. United States163 invalidated as improper
“Federal commandeering of state governments”164 the provisions of
the Brady Act that required a state or local “chief law enforcement
officer” to perform certain federally mandated activities in
connection with the transfer of handguns.165
In contrast, I borrow the notion of commandeering to
describe the consequences of Quill’s judicially created dormant
Commerce Clause restraint on states’ abilities to enforce their
sales taxes: The physical presence test effectively commandeers
the states to serve the cause of a sales-tax-free Internet. Quill’s
physical presence test does not impose an affirmative duty on
the states. Rather, this judge-made test prevents the states
from enforcing their sales taxes by precluding the states from
imposing collection duties upon out-of-state Internet and mailorder sellers.
The Court has never applied the “commandeering” label
to this kind of judicially imposed restraint. However, that label
illuminates the considerations which should lead the Court to
overturn Quill rather than defer to Congress to correct that
decision as a matter of stare decisis: The sales tax is a bulwark
of state and local finance, today seriously hampered by Quill’s
physical presence test, which prevents the states from imposing
sales tax collection responsibilities upon out-of-state sellers. The
commandeering case law, even if it addresses the factually
different circumstances of congressionally imposed affirmative
duties, highlights the severe impediment Quill creates for a core
state function, namely, enforcing the states’ sales taxes in light of
the shift to electronic commerce. It is not necessary for the Court,
when it reconsiders Quill, to literally extend the “commandeering”
label to Quill. It is necessary, to overcome the force of stare decisis,
to recognize the urgent need for the Court itself to overturn Quill
rather than rely on the legislative process. The states are at a
significant political disadvantage as they seek to overturn Quill in
the halls of Congress.
A variant of this critique would contend that my
analysis (like the commandeering doctrine as applied by the
Court) proves too much. Much federal law impacts the states.
163
164
165

521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 925.
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C § 922 (2012).
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The effort to protect the states judicially from untoward federal
interference, the argument goes, is not subject to any principled
standards. This is the perspective the Court embraced in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority:166 There is no
“organizing principle”167 for determining when the Court should
protect the states from federal regulation.
No one doubts that a state legislator flying to the state
capital for a legislative session must go through TSA screening
even though she is undertaking the flight to execute her duties
as a state official. There is no good way, the argument runs, to
distinguish this kind of federal activity that can permissibly
impact the states from federal regulation that so disrupts the
states that such regulation should be invalidated as
“commandeering.” In this vein, Justice Stevens criticizes the
notion of “commandeering” as “an arbitrary rule of etiquette.”168
I use the commandeering label to summarize the
considerations that should lead the Court itself to overturn Quill
rather than rely on Congress to correct Quill under the banner
of stare decisis. At the end of the day, I am confident that, if the
Court overturns Quill on these grounds, it can leave for the
future the identification of other areas (if any) in which the
states deserve protection from untoward federal interventions in
their affairs.
A related criticism is that judicial reversal of Quill would
open the door to a broader attack on the Supreme Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause case law. My assessment of that case
law is mixed. I conclude that the Court’s tax-related
nondiscrimination decisions are incoherent,169 while the Court’s
apportionment and nexus case law under the dormant Commerce
Clause is largely correct170—Quill being the chief exception.
The Court can reverse Quill without addressing the
broader debate about the validity vel non of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Here, the pragmatic concerns identified by

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 539.
168 STEVENS, supra note 118, at 28–29.
169 Edward A. Zelinsky, Essay, The Incoherence of Dormant Commerce Clause
Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653, 653 (2007)
(“[T]he notion of dormant commerce clause tax nondiscrimination currently rests on two
untenable distinctions: the distinction between tax incentives and direct expenditures
and the distinction between tax provisions which are deemed discriminatory and those
which are not. . . . [N]either of these distinctions is today workable or persuasive.”);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of Dormant
Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NOTES 941 (2007), reprinted at 118 TAX
NOTES 57 (2007).
170 Zelinsky, supra note 144, at 59.
166

167
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Justice Kennedy play a critical role.171 By their severity, these
practical concerns distinguish Quill from the Court’s other
dormant Commerce Clause cases. Quill severely hampers a core
state function, i.e., the ability of the states to collect sales taxes
in the face of the growth of electronic commerce. No other
dormant Commerce Clause decision has such serious
contemporary consequences for the states. On these pragmatic
grounds, the Court can legitimately overturn Quill as sui
generis while simultaneously relinquishing to Congress the job
of evaluating the Court’s other dormant Commerce Clause cases.
Consider, for example, Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, which struck a Maine property tax
exemption limited to camps that predominantly served Maine
residents rather than out-of-staters.172 The Supreme Court held
that this resident-based property tax exemption impermissibly
discriminated against nonresidents under the dormant
Commerce Clause.173 I think that Camps Newfound/Owatonna
is wrongly decided since an economically equivalent direct
subsidy for residents is apparently deemed constitutional.
However, for present purposes, the point is that the Court’s
outlawing of resident-based property tax subsidies does not
severely impede a critical state function, unlike the barriers to
sales tax collection raised by Quill and its physical presence
test.174 Of course, when the Court decided Quill in 1992, no one
foresaw that that decision would have such drastic consequences
for the states’ sales taxes in the new world of electronic
commerce. Today, those consequences are obvious.
In short, an important factor distinguishes Quill from
other dormant Commerce Clause decisions, namely, the severity
of the impediments the physical presence test today imposes
upon the states’ sales taxes, taxes that are central to the
functioning of the states that levy them.175 This distinction
credibly permits the Court to itself overturn Quill while
adhering to a policy of stare decisis for its other, less impactful
dormant Commerce Clause decisions.
Consider as well the possible argument that my
invocation of the “commandeering” label in the Commerce
Clause context might threaten both legislation that Congress
See supra pp. 1188–89, 1203–04.
520 U.S. 564 (1997).
173 Id. at 581 (“[T]he Maine statute facially discriminates against interstate
commerce. . . . .”).
174 Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for
Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 36 (2002).
175 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 651–52.
171

172

1210

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:3

has adopted under the Commerce Clause to coordinate the
states’ tax laws176 and similar laws that Congress might adopt in
the future.177 Here again, reasonable distinctions can and
should be drawn. Quill and its physical presence test for sales
tax purposes have a severe impact upon the states and are thus
appropriately reversed under the rubric of commandeering. In
contrast, existing and proposed Commerce Clause legislation,
while substantively significant, does not impede core state
functions as does Quill.
Illustrative in this context is the federal statute
governing the state taxation of “retirement income.”178 This law
prevents any state from taxing “any retirement income of an
individual” unless such individual is “a resident or domiciliary”
of the taxing state.179 Thus, for example, a California resident
who retires to Nevada need not pay California income tax on the
individual retirement account (IRA) this individual accumulated
in California but liquidates in Nevada, which has no state
income tax.180
California undoubtedly considers it significant that it
cannot tax the IRA withdrawals of its former residents. However,
it does not appear to me (and I think to most others who study
state and local taxation) that this prohibition is a burden
comparable to the impact of Quill and its physical presence test
on California’s ability to collect its sales taxes on Internet and
mail-order purchases. Thus, the “commandeering” label ought not
apply to this legislation.
Those who think the Court was right in Garcia will rejoin
that this is a subjective judgment. But judgment is what we hire
judges to do. In this case, the more compelling judgment is that
the federal law which prevents a former state of residence from
taxing the retirement distributions of individuals who are now
nonresidents does not have a drastic effect on a core state
function similar to Quill’s impact on states’ sales taxes.
Consider finally the rejoinder that the pragmatic case
against Quill is by itself enough for the Court to overturn that
decision rather than relegate the topic to Congress. However,
bad consequences are by themselves not enough to overcome
the force of stare decisis. The losing party can always point to
176 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 11108(b)(2)(B) (2012); 49 U.S.C. §§ 11502(a), 14503(a)
(2012); see also Zelinsky, supra note 144, at 36–37.
177 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Pass the Multi-state Worker Act Also, 80 ST. TAX
NOTES 719 (2016).
178 4 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
179 Id. § 114(a).
180 142 CONG. REC. 2189 (1996) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).
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its adverse results from its loss in the Court. When Congress can
overturn the Court, it requires more than bad consequences for
the Court to reverse itself, particularly when there has been
extensive political debate as there has been about Quill.
To justify the Court overruling Quill requires, in addition
to the pragmatic argument about Quill’s bad consequences, the
other elements of my analysis—i.e., the tactical advantage Quill
bestows in the political process upon the Internet and mail-order
industries, the importance of the states in the structure of
federalism, the importance of sales taxes to the financing of
state government, the severe impediment Quill raises to the
collection of those taxes, and the unique disadvantages of the
states in the federal legislative process.
V.

THE POST-QUILL WORLD

If the Court were to overturn Quill and its physical
presence test, the next issue would be whether Congress should
legislate to provide nationwide standards governing when an
out-of-state retailer makes sufficient sales into a state for the
state to impose upon that retailer the obligation to collect the
state’s tax. This question would present an interesting tactical
quandary for the Internet and mail-order industries in the
post-Quill world: whether to seek federal legislation defining
the threshold for the obligation to collect sales taxes or to fight
over such thresholds state-by-state.
Consider again, in this context, the South Dakota,
Alabama, and Wyoming challenges to Quill. South Dakota’s
statute181 imposes the duty to collect sales tax on an out-of-state
retailer if, in the current or previous year, the retailer’s gross
revenues in South Dakota exceed $100,000182 or if, in the current
or prior year, the retailer has “two hundred or more separate
transactions” in South Dakota.183 Wyoming’s bill is similar.184
Alabama’s regulation is not triggered by a particular number of
Alabama sales or by the volume of the current year’s sales.
Rather, the Alabama regulation imposes the obligation to collect
sales tax on an out-of-state Internet or mail-order firm with total
sales to Alabama customers over $250,000 in the prior year.185
In the post-Quill world, each state could establish its
own standard, subject to ultimate judicial determination that a
181
182
183
184
185

S. 106, 91st Leg. Assemb. Sess. § 1 (S.D. 2016).
Id. § 1(1).
Id. § 1(2).
H.B. 0019, 64th Leg., 2017 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03(1)(a) (2015).
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state’s threshold for sales tax collection duty is too low to establish
“substantial nexus” to the taxing state to satisfy Complete Auto.
An important issue in this context would be the
identification of affiliated entities. If a state or federal rule
were to apply separately to each legally distinct but commonly
owned retail entity, a company could establish multiple
subsidiaries to keep the sales of each subsidiary below the
statutory minimum. More sensibly, commonly controlled
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies
should, for these purposes, be aggregated and treated as a single
entity so that the obligation to collect sales tax could not be
avoided by dividing sales among legally separate, but commonly
controlled, entities. The Internal Revenue Code contains a variety
of formulas for aggregating legally distinct, but commonly
controlled, businesses.186 One of these formulas could be
incorporated by any state or could be incorporated into federal
legislation establishing rules for the states to follow.
On balance, I conclude that federal legislation would be
useful in the post-Quill world to establish when states can
impose sales tax collection responsibilities on out-of-state
retailers lacking in-state physical presence and to aggregate
legally distinct but commonly controlled entities to assess
that responsibility.187
Federal legislation could provide that the states could
adopt tests more lenient than the federal rule. Suppose, for
example, that Congress were to declare that any state can
impose sales and use tax collection responsibilities on any outof-state retailer if the retailer and its affiliated entities sold
$100,000 of merchandise or services into the state in the prior
year. Federal legislation could permit states to impose a higher
threshold, e.g., $200,000 of in-state sales. However, I suspect
that, in practice, the federal minimum standard would become
the nationwide norm.

186 See I.R.C. § 267 (2012) (losses disallowed and deductions deferred based on
common ownership and family affiliation); id. § 318 (constructive ownership of stock for
certain corporate tax purposes); id. §§ 414(a), 414(b), 414(m), 414(o) (constructive
ownership rules for pension purposes); id. § 1504 (affiliated group for consolidated
return purposes); id. § 1551(b) (controlled group for purposes of disallowing graduated
corporate rates); id. § 1563 (definition of controlled group).
187 If enacted into law, the Marketplace Fairness Act would utilize Internal
Revenue Code § 267 and § 707 to aggregate legally distinct entities. See Marketplace
Fairness Act, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2015); Remote Transactions Parity Act of
2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong. (2015).
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CONCLUSION
If the combatants over Quill were just the remote sales
industries and their brick-and-mortar competitors, stare decisis
considerations would counsel that Congress, not the Court,
should decide the fate of Quill’s physical presence test. The
conventional retail industry has the challenging political burden
of securing Quill’s repeal while the Internet and mail-order
industries have the politically easier task of blocking legislation
which would overturn Quill and its physical presence test. This
theoretical situation would not differ from the political
environment that exists whenever one private interest prevails
in the Supreme Court and another loses.
However, Quill is a dormant Commerce Clause decision
that effectively commandeers the states to subsidize Internet
commerce by not effectively taxing it. When the states are
commandeered in this fashion, the states, despite their
important role in the structure of federalism, are at a significant
political disadvantage. The states, unlike private interests, do
not bestow votes and campaign contributions on members of
Congress. Federal legislators have no politically compelling
reason to help the states overturn a decision like Quill. The
benefits from the repeal of Quill—more state sales tax revenues
resulting in increased state spending, lower state tax rates, or
both—redound to the political advantage of the governors,
mayors, and state legislators who will control these revenues.
Federal legislators, in contrast, get no political benefit from the
state revenues raised by the repeal of Quill.
If Quill and its physical presence test are to be
overturned, it is, as a matter of political process, the Supreme
Court that must do the overturning to preserve the states’ sales
tax in the face of the growth of Internet commerce. The Court
should overturn Quill in the Court’s role as guardian of the
states against federal commandeering in light of a combination
of relevant factors: the tactical advantage Quill bestows in the
political process upon the Internet and mail-order industries,
the importance of the states in the structure of federalism, the
centrality of sales taxes to the financing of state government,
the severe impediment Quill raises to the collection of those
taxes, and the unique disadvantages of the states in the federal
legislative process. Cumulatively, these considerations suggest
that the Supreme Court should overturn Quill rather than
letting Congress do so.

